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any history of prior, racial discrimination.
Further, the system acted as a ceiling for minority
access to housing opportunities.
The court concluded that Starrett's allocation
of public housing on the basis of racial quotas
clearly had a discriminatory effect on minorities.
Starrett conceded the discriminatory effect of its
plan but had two major defenses. First, Starrett
argued that it was clothed with governmental
authority by its receipt of federal funding and
thus was obligated to affirmatively promote
integration. The court declined to decide
whether Starrett was a state actor but concluded
that even if Starrett were a state actor, the racial
quotas Starrett used were invalid affirmative
action plans under the Fair Housing Act.
Starrett next argued that a "white flight" phenomenon justified its use of racial quotas to
maintain integration. In support of this argument, Starrett relied upon Otero v. New York
City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir.
1973), where the court held that public housing
authorities had a duty to integrate housing
complexes and to prevent racial segregation
even if their actions in so doing prevented some
minorities from residing in particular housing.
In Otero, the landlords rented half of a group of
newly renovated apartments to non-former occupants, instead of renting to former occupants
who were predominately minorities. The court
distinguished Otero because there the renting
procedures did not involve a plan for long-term
maintenance of specified levels of integration.
The court held the Otero plan to be a single
event which did not operate as a strict racial
quota. Starrett's plan, in contrast, operated to
determine exact racial distribution on an indefinite basis.
Dissent: Use of Quotas Discriminatory Only if
They Result in Segregation
The dissent concluded that Starrett was within
the spirit of the Fair Housing Act by maintaining

UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS DETERMINES THAT
GENERAL MOTORS' BRAKING
SYSTEM WAS NOT PROVEN
DEFECTIVE
In U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 400
(D.C. Cir. 1988), the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered a claim that General Motors Corporation ("GM") manufactured automobiles with a
defective braking system. The claim, brought
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act ("the Act"), alleged that GM knew, or
should have known, that the braking system in

an integrated housing complex through the use
of quotas. First, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of the purpose of the
Fair Housing Act. The Fair Housing Act was
intended to prohibit segregation, not integration. As authority for this interpretation, the dissent noted that neither the Fair Housing Act nor
its legislative history explicitly indicates whether
Congress intended to prohibit racially maintained integration. Therefore, the dissent
claimed that the Fair Housing Act was never
intended to apply to actions such as Starrett's
which maintained an integrated rather than
segregated complex. Second, the dissent relied
upon the holding in Otero, which the dissent
characterized as generally not prohibiting racial
rental quotas adopted to promote integration
under the Fair Housing Act. The dissent in fact
found the instant case easier to decide than
Otero because Starrett promoted integration
through quotas from the inception of the complex. In Otero, on the other hand, the New York
Housing Authority attempted to achieve integration by extricating itself from commitments it
had made with minority tenants. Finally, the dissent stated that public policy decisions of this
nature should be determined by the legislature
and not by the courts.
Stephanie Ferst
Editor's Note: On November 7,1988, the United
States Supreme Court denied the petition for
writ of certiorari. justice White would have
granted the writ. 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 7,
1988) (No. 88-82). The United States Department
of Justice, the NAACP, and the City of Chicago
have challenged a "managed integration" quota
system used by the directors of Atrium Village, a
309-apartment complex in Chicago. Their view
is that the directors violated the Fair Housing Act
by manipulating the list of rental applicants to
maintain a 50-50 balance of black and white
tenants.
its 1980 model X-cars caused premature rearwheel lock-up. The complaint further alleged
that excessive corrosion over time aggravated
that condition, and that GM violated the Act by
failing to notify the Secretary of Treasury and
failing to remedy the defect. The Court of
Appeals held that there was not a class-wide
defect and affirmed the trial court's judgment in
favor of GM.
Background
Development of the X-car by GM began in
1975. In 1978, GM engineers first obtained information indicating a potential brake problem. In
a test of GM's model X-cars, drivers registered
complaints of "premature" rear-wheel lock(continued on page 24)
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ups, which caused skidding and spin-out. As a
result, GM formed a special task force to examine the braking system. Within a few weeks, the
task force suggested that a number of design
changes be made in three component parts of
the braking system, but recommended against
delaying production. The recommended design
changes were phased in gradually during 1979,
and thus resulted in 1980 model X-cars with several different brake configurations.
In July, 1981, after receiving an unusually high
number of consumer complaints about rearwheel lock-up, the National Highway and Traffic
Safety Agency ("NHTSA") opened a formal investigation of GM's model X-car. That same month,
GM agreed to make one of the three design
changes originally recommended by the task
force, but did not acknowledge the existence of
a defect. NHTSA continued its own investigation, and in January, 1983, found that both manual and automatic 1980 X-cars with their original
brake linings had a safety defect. This finding
was widely publicized. In fact, NHTSA released a
film clip to television networks which showed an
X-car spinning out of control. Faced with that
publicity, GM agreed to voluntarily recall all
1980 model X-cars with manual transmissions
and some 1980 model X-cars with automatic
transmissions. Shortly thereafter, NHTSA requested that GM produce copies of all internal
documents relating to premature rear-wheel
lock-up. Some of the documents revealed that
GM's bureaucracy harbored concerns about the
lock-up problem. As a result, NHTSA contacted
the Department of justice ("the Government"),
which filed suit against GM in 1983.
Some skidding, caused by lock-up, can occur
with any car. Such a phenomenon is often a
product of weather conditions or the level of
braking force applied. The key issue in the
instant case was whether the skidding experienced by drivers of GM's model X-cars resulted from premature lock-up. The court observed that this defect, "by its terms, included
concepts of causation (skidding or lock-up
caused by rear wheels) and consumer expectations (skidding or lock-up that was premature)."
841 F.2d at 406 (emphasis in original).
The Trial
In attempting to prove a class-wide defect in
the bench trial, the Government relied mainly
on two types of evidence. First, the Government
relied on the testimony of twelve consumers
and the depositions of others describing their
personal experiences with skidding and loss of
control. The trial judge noted that the Govern-

ment's evidence demonstrated that as many as
3000 GM customers probably experienced similar incidents and internal GM documents corroborated additional consumer complaint evidence offered by NHTSA. Second, the Government described GM's initial identification of the
problem and the formation of the task force.
The Government revealed that durability testing
conducted by GM after production began indicated that the problem persisted.
In its defense, GM relied upon brake testing
data and accident statistics. First, GM produced
extensive test data comparing the braking performance of the X-car with that of other manufacturers' cars. The tests were conducted by
both GM and NHTSA, and the results were uniformly favorable to GM. None of the tests isolated any physical engineering cause which
would explain the rear-wheel lock-up, and none
replicated the type of incident complained of by
consumers. Second, GM demonstrated through
the use of state and NHTSA statistics that the
X-cars had lower rates of accident involvement
than various models manufactured by competitors.
In order to demonstrate a defect under the
Act, the trial court required the Government to
show that actual brake failures had occurred and
not merely that consumers had complained. The
trial court did not consider the consumer complaints to be sufficiently reliable to justify an
inference of a specific brake problem. Moreover, the trial court found that the test resultsdisproved the existence of any common problem in the braking system of GM's model X-cars.
Even assuming a defect existed, the trial court
found that the Government still had failed to
demonstrate that GM's model X-cars presented
an unreasonable risk of accidents or injury.
The Appeal
On appeal, the Government attacked certain
aspects of the trial judge's decision. The Government's principle contention was that the trial
judge erred as a matter of law by accepting the
truth of the representative consumer testimony,
but holding that this testimony plus other complaints were legally insufficient to demonstrate a
defect. According to the Government, the occurrence of lock-up under conditions in which
drivers would not expect it was sufficient under
the Act to demonstrate the presence of a defect.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
Act was concerned with the real-world performance of cars. The court cautioned, however,
that previous cases did not suggest that a car is
defective under the Act regardless of whether
the car, the driver, or the roadway isresponsible.
In order to demonstrate a defect within the
meaning of the Act, the Government must show

that the vehicle itself is defective-either in its
performance, construction, components, or materials. Thus, the Government had to demonstrate that the incidents of skidding occurred
under circumstances in which, absent a defect,
they would not have otherwise occurred. The
Court of Appeals held that the consumers were
not capable of determining whether the incidents they had experienced would not have
occurred otherwise. The court did not hold,
however, that consumer-complaint evidence
alone could never suffice to demonstrate a
defect under the Act. Instead, the court limited
its decision to the facts of this case, in which
consumer-complaint testimony did not prove a
defect.
In addition to the consumer complaints,
NHTSA also relied on the relative complaint
rates for X-cars and for other cars to show that
the X-cars were defective. NHTSA claimed the
different complaint rates indicated that the Xcars, rather than other factors, were responsible
for the skidding. The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument because the number of complaints for the model X-cars was probably increased by the excessive publicity surrounding
them. According to the court, the film clip
which described the X-car was witnessed by
approximately 53 million viewers, and follow-up
newspaper and television stories added to the

public's awareness. As evidence that this publicity affected the complaint rate, the court noted
that GM and NHTSA received more complaints
during the two weeks following the release of
the film clip than they had in the previous 31/2
years. Thus, GM was able to explain the high rate
of complaints by reference to a factor other than
vehicle malfunction. As a result, the skidding
experienced by consumers was not linked to any
malfunction in GM's model X-cars.
Finally,the Government objected to GM's use
of test data to rebut the Government's evidence
of a defect. According to the Government, GM
could rebut the Government's evidence in only
two ways: 1) by showing that any failure in the
braking system resulted from gross and unforeseeable owner abuse or neglect; or 2) by showing that any failure in the braking system occurred in non-dangerous situations. The court
rejected this contention. Instead, the Court of
Appeals held that the test data was relevant to
show that the skidding could have been caused
by factors other than vehicle malfunction, and
that GM's X-car was no more likely to experience skidding than other cars. The court also
rejected the Government's claim that the tests
used by GM were unrepresentative, and affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of GM.
Peggy Healy

FEDERALLY INSURED STATE
CHARTERED MINNESOTA
BANKS MAY CHARGE 21.75
PERCENT INTEREST ON
AGRICULTURAL LOANS
WITHOUT VIOLATING STATE
USURY LAWS

each case, the Minnesota bank charged higher
interest rates on agricultural loans than on other
loans. The plaintiffs sued the banks for violation
of the state usury laws. In three cases, Vanderweyst, Walsh, and Heimark, the actual interest
rates ranged from 11.85% to 16%; in Bandas, the
plaintiff alleged the bank charged 51.52% interest.
The borrowers contended that: (1) the federally insured, state chartered banks do not have
"most favored lender" status; therefore, the
banks do not have a choice between interest
rates under 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a); and, (2) under
Minnesota law, the maximum interest rate that a
lending institution can charge on agricultural
loans is 4.5% in excess of the prevailing federal
discount rate. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.011 (West 1981
& Supp. 1988).
The banks responded that pursuant to their
"most favored lender" status under federal law,
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a), they are allowed to charge
the highest interest rate permitted by Minnesota
law. According to Minnesota law, industrial loan
and thrift institutions can charge 21.75% on agricultural loans; consequently, federally insured,
state chartered banks are also authorized to
charge 21.75% on agricultural loans. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 53.04 (West 1988). In all four cases, the trial

The Minnesota Supreme Court in Vanderweyst v. First State Bank of Benson, 425 N.W.2d
803 (1988), held that pursuant to federal law, 12
U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1982), state chartered, federally insured banks have "most favored lender"
status and can charge interest on agricultural
loans at the highest rate available to any competing lender under state law. As a result, banks
could charge up to 21.75 percent on agricultural
loans without violating Minnesota's usury laws.
Federally Insured, State Chartered Banks Have
"Most Favored Lender" Status
The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated
four cases for appeal: Vanderweyst v. First Bank
of Benson, 408 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. App. 1987);
Walsh v. First Bank of Pennock (and Heimark v.
Norwest Bank Montevideo), 409 N.W.2d 5 (Minn.
App. 1987); and Bandas v. Citizens State Bank of
Silver Lake, 412 N.W.2d 818 (Minn. App. 1987). In
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